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Abstract
Timed Concurrent Constraint Programming (tcc) is a declarative model
for concurrency offering a logic for specifying reactive systems, i.e. sys-
tems that continuously interact with the environment. The universal tcc
formalism (utcc) is an extension of tcc with the ability to express mo-
bility. Here mobility is understood as communication of private names as
typically done for mobile systems and security protocols. In this paper
we consider the denotational semantics for tcc, and we extend it to a
”collecting” semantics for utcc based on closure operators over sequences
of constraints. Relying on this semantics, we formalize the first general
framework for data flow analyses of tcc and utcc programs by abstract in-
terpretation techniques. The concrete and abstract semantics we propose
are compositional, thus allowing us to reduce the complexity of data flow
analyses. We show that our method is sound and parametric w.r.t. the ab-
stract domain. Thus, different analyses can be performed by instantiating
the framework. We illustrate how it is possible to reuse abstract domains
previously defined for logic programming, e.g., to perform a groundness
analysis for tcc programs. We show the applicability of this analysis in
the context of reactive systems. Furthermore, we make also use of the ab-
stract semantics to exhibit a secrecy flaw in a security protocol. We have
developed a prototypical implementation of our methodology and we have
implemented the abstract domain for security to perform automatically
the secrecy analysis.
1 Introduction
Concurrent Constraint Programming (ccp) [29] is a process calculus which com-
bines the traditional operational view of process calculi with a declarative one
based upon logic. This combination allows ccp to benefit from the large body of
reasoning techniques of both process calculi and logic. In fact, ccp-based calculi
have successfully been used in the modelling and verification of several concur-
rent scenarios: biological, security, timed, reactive and stochastic systems, see
e.g., [29, 25, 27, 23, 28, 18].
In the ccp model, agents interact by telling and asking pieces of information
(constraints) on a shared store of partial information. The type of constraints
1
that agents can tell and ask (e.g. x ≤ 42) is parametric in an underlying
constraint system.
The ccp model has been extended to consider the execution of processes
along a series of time intervals or time-units. In tccp [7], the notion of time is
identified with the time needed to ask and tell information to the store. In this
model, the information in the store is carried through the time units. On the
other hand, in Timed ccp (tcc) [28], stores are not automatically transferred
between time-units. This way, computations during a time-unit proceed mono-
tonically but outputs of two different time-units are not supposed to be related
to each other.
More precisely, computations in tcc take place in bursts of activity at a
rate controlled by the environment. In this model, the environment provides
a stimulus (input) in the form of a constraint. Then the system, after a finite
number of internal reductions, outputs the final store (a constraint) and waits for
the next interaction with the environment. This view of reactive computation
is akin to synchronous languages such as Esterel [2] where the system reacts
continuously with the environment at a rate controlled by the environment.
These languages allow then to program safety critical applications as control
systems, for which it is fundamental to develop tools aiming at helping to
develop correct, secure, and efficient programs.
Universal tcc [27] (utcc), adds to tcc the expressiveness needed for mobil-
ity. Here we understand mobility as the ability to communicate private names
(or variables) much like in the π-calculus [22]. Basically, the tcc ask oper-
ator when c do P is generalized by a parametric ask operator of the form
(abs ~x; c)P called abstraction. Roughly speaking, an ask process of the form
P = when c do Q remains blocked until the store is strong enough to entail
the constraint c and then P behaves as Q. In the case of P = (abs ~x; c)Q,
the process Q[~t/~x] is executed for all term ~t such that the current store entails
c[~t/~x]. Notice that when ~x is the empty vector, we recover the tcc ask operator.
Several domains and frameworks, e.g. [6, 5, 1], have been proposed for
the analysis of logic programs. The particular characteristics of the timed ccp
programs pose additional difficulties for the development of such tools in this
language. Namely, the concurrent, timed nature of the language, and the syn-
chronization mechanisms by entailment of constraints (blocking asks). Aiming
at statically analyzing utcc as well as tcc programs, we have to consider the
additional technical issues due to mobility, particularly, the infinite internal
computations generated by the abs operator in utcc.
We develop here a semantics for tcc and utcc which collects all concrete
information which is then suitable to properly abstract the properties of interest.
This semantics is based on closure operators over sequences of constraints in
the lines of [28]. Our semantics is precise for tcc and allows us to effectively
approximate the operational semantics of utcc and compositionally describe
the behavior of programs. We prove this semantics to be fully abstract w.r.t
the operational semantics for a significant fragment of the calculus. Next, we
propose an abstract denotational semantics which approximates the concrete
one.
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Our framework is formalized by abstract interpretation techniques and is
parametric w.r.t. the abstract domain. It allows us to exploit also the work
done for developing abstract domains for logic programs. Moreover, we can
make new analyses for reactive and mobile systems, thus widening the reasoning
techniques, available for both, tcc and utcc (e.g., type systems [17], logical
characterizations [21, 23, 27], semantics [28, 26, 23] ).
The abstraction we propose proceeds in two-levels. First, we approximate
the constraint system leading to an abstract constraint system. We give the
sufficient conditions which have to be satisfied for ensuring the soundness of
the abstraction. Next, since we are dealing with infinite sequences of (abstract)
constraints, we approximate the output of the program by a finite cut. It is
worth noticing that the abstract semantics here proposed is computable and
compositional. Thus, it allows us to master the complexity of the data-flow
analyses. Moreover, the abstraction over-approximates the concrete semantics
and then it preserves safety properties.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first ones to propose a general ab-
stract interpretation framework for a language adhering to the above-mentioned
characteristics of tcc or utcc programs. Hence we can develop analyses for
several applications of utcc or its sub-calculus tcc (see [25] for a survey of
applications of ccp-based languages). In particular, in this paper we instanti-
ate our framework in two different scenarios. The first one tailors an abstract
domain for groundness and type dependencies analysis in logic programming to
perform a groundness analysis of a tcc program. This analysis is proven useful
to derive a property of a control system specified in tcc. The second scenario
presents an abstraction of a cryptographic constraint system. We then use the
abstract semantics to approximate the behavior of the protocol and exhibit a
secrecy flaw in a security protocol programmed in utcc.
We have also developed a prototypical application of our framework and im-
plemented the abstract domain for the verification of secrecy properties. The
examples in Section 5.3 were automatically verified with this tool available at
http://www.lix.polytechnique.fr/~colarte/prototype/. In this URL the
reader can also find the complete outputs of these examples as well as the ap-
plication of the framework for the verification of another protocol not described
in this paper.
We believe that our results can also help to define analyses for other lan-
guages for modeling reactive systems, e.g. Esterel [2], and for mobile compu-
tations (e.g. for languages based on the π-calculus [22]). See the discussion on
related work in Section 6.
Organization The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 re-
calls the notion of constraint system and the operational semantics of tcc and
utcc. In Section 3 we develop the denotational semantics based on sequences
of constraints. Next, in Section 4, we study the abstract interpretation frame-
work for tcc and utcc programs. The two instances and the applications of the
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framework are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Due to a lack of space, the proofs are omitted; they are included in the
extended version of this paper [13].
2 Preliminaries
ccp-based calculi are parametric in a constraint system specifying the basic
constraints (e.g. x ≤ 42) agents can tell and ask. Here we consider an abstract
definition of such systems as lattices following [29]. The notion of constraint
system as first-order formulae (e.g. in [27, 23]) can be seen as an instance of
this definition. All results of this paper still hold, of course, when more concrete
systems are considered.
A cylindric constraint system is a structure
C = 〈C,≤,⊔, true, false,Var ,∃, d〉 s.t.:
• 〈C,≤,⊔, true, false〉 is a lattice with ⊔ the lub operation (representing
the logical and), and true, false the least and the greatest elements in
C respectively. Elements in C are called constraints with typical elements
c, c′, d, d′....
• Var is a denumerable set of variables and for each x ∈ Var the function
∃x : C → C is a cylindrification operator satisfying: (1) ∃xc ≤ c. (2) If
c ≤ d then ∃xc ≤ ∃xd. (3) ∃x(c ⊔ ∃xd) = ∃xc ⊔ ∃xd. (4) ∃x∃yc = ∃y∃xc.
• For each x, y ∈ Var , dxy ∈ C is a diagonal element and it satisfies: (1)
dxx = true. (2) If z is different from x, y then dxy = ∃z(dxz ⊔ dzy). (3) If
x is different from y then c ≤ dxy ⊔ ∃x(c ⊔ dxy).
The cylindrification operators model a sort of existential quantification, helpful
for defining the hiding operator as we explain below. The diagonal elements are
useful to model parameter passing in procedures calls. If C contains an equality
theory, then dxy can be thought as the formulae x = y.
We say that d entails c in C iff c ≤ d and we write d ⊢ c. If d ⊢ c and c ⊢ d
we write d ≡ c.
We lift the previous notations to sequences of constraints. We denote re-
spectively by C∗, Cω the set of finite and infinite sequences of constraints with
typical elements s, s′.... We use cω to denote the sequence c.c.c.... The length of
s is denoted by |s| and the empty sequence by ǫ. The i-th element in s is s(i).
We write s ≤ s′ iff |s| ≤ |s′| and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , |s|}, s′(i) ⊢ s(i). If |s| = |s′|
and for all i ∈ {1, ..., |s|}, s(i) ≡ s′(i), we shall write s ≡ s′.
We denote by T the set of terms in the constraint system. We use ~t for a
sequence of terms t1, . . . , tn with length |~t| = n. If |~t| = 0 then ~t is written as
ǫ. We use c[~t/~x], where |~t| = |~x| and xi’s are pairwise distinct, to denote c in
which the free occurrences of xi have been replaced with ti. The substitution
[~t/~x] will be similarly applied to other syntactic entities. We shall use
.
= to
denote syntactic term equivalence (e.g., x
.
= x and x 6
.
= y).
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2.1 Reactive Systems and Timed CCP
Reactive systems [2] are those that react continuously with their environment
at a rate controlled by the environment. For example, a controller or a signal-
processing system, receive a stimulus (input) from the environment. It computes
an output and then, waits for the next interaction with the environment.
In the ccp model, the shared store of constraints grows monotonically, i.e.,
agents cannot drop information (constraints) from it. Then, a systems that
changes the state of a signal (i.e., the value of a variable) cannot be modeled:
The conjunction of the constraints signal = on and signal = off leads to an
inconsistent store.
The timed ccp calculus (tcc) [28] extends ccp for reactive systems. Time
is conceptually divided into time intervals (or time units). In a particular time
interval, a ccp process P gets an input c from the environment, it executes
with this input as the initial store, and when it reaches its resting point, it
outputs the resulting store d to the environment. The resting point determines
also a residual process Q which is then executed in the next time unit. The
resulting store d is not automatically transferred to the next time unit. This
way, computations during a time-unit proceed monotonically but outputs of two
different time-units are not supposed to be related to each other. Therefore, the
variable signal above may change its value when passing from one time-unit to
the next one.
In the following we present the syntax of tcc following the notation in [23].
Definition 1 (tcc Processes) The set Proc of tcc processes is built from
constraints in the underlying constraint system by the following syntax :
P,Q := skip | tell(c) | when c do P | P ‖ Q |
(local ~x; c)P | nextP | unless c nextP |
!P | p(~x)
The process skip does nothing thus representing inaction. The process
tell(c) adds c to the store in the current time interval making it available to the
other processes. The ask process when c do P remains blocked until the store
is strong enough to entail the guard c; if so, it behaves like P .
The parallel composition of P and Q is denoted by P ‖ Q. Given a set of
indexes I = {i1, ..., in}, we shall use
∏
i∈I
Pi to denote the parallel composition
Pi1 ‖ ... ‖ Pin .
The process (local ~x; c)P binds ~x in P by declaring it private to P . It
behaves like P , except that all the information on the variables ~x produced
by P can only be seen by P and the information on the global variable in ~x
produced by other processes cannot be seen by P . The local information on ~x
produced by P corresponds to the constraint c representing a local store. When
c = true, we shall simply write (local ~x)P instead of (local ~x; true)P.
We shall use bv(Q) (resp. fv(Q)) to denote the set of bound (resp. free)
variables occurring in Q.
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micCtrl(Error,Button) :–
(localE′, B′, e, b) (
! tell(Error = [e | E′] ⊔Button = [b|B′])
‖ when on ⊔ open do
! tell(e = yes ⊔ E′ = [] ⊔ b = stop)
‖ when off do (tell(e = no) ‖ nextmicCtrl(E ′,B ′))
‖ when closed do (tell(e = no) ‖ nextmicCtrl(E ′,B ′)))
Figure 1: tcc model for a microwave controller.
The unit-delay nextP executes P in the next time unit. The time-out
unless c nextP is also a unit-delay, but P is executed in the next time unit iff
c is not entailed by the final store at the current time interval. We use nextnP
as a shorthand for next . . .nextP , with next repeated n times. Finally, the
replication !P means P ‖ nextP ‖ next2P ‖ . . ., i.e., unboundedly many copies
of P but one at a time.
Assume a (recursive) procedure definition p(~y) :– P where fv(P ) ⊆ ~y.
The call p(~x) replaces the formal parameters ~y in P with the actual param-
eters ~x. Recursive calls in P must be guarded by a next process to avoid
non-terminating sequences of recursive calls during a time-unit (see [28, 23]).
Let us give an example of a control system modeled in tcc.
Example 1 (Control System) Assume a simple control system for a mi-
crowave checking that the door must be closed when it is turned on. Otherwise,
it must emit an error signal. The specification in tcc of this system is depicted
in Figure 1.
In this tcc program, constraints of the form X = [e|X ′] asserts that X is a
list with head e and tail X ′. This way, the process micCtrl binds Error to a
list ended by “yes” when the microwave was turned on and the door was open
at the same interval of time. Furthermore, the constant stop is added into the
list Button signaling the environment that the microwave must be powered off.
Later on, in Section 5.2, we shall show how the abstract interpretation frame-
work developed here allows for the verification of this system.
2.2 Mobile behavior and UTCC
The tcc calculus lacks of mechanisms for name passing, i.e., mobility in the
sense of the π-calculus [22]. Let us illustrate this with an example. Let out(·)
be a constraint and let P = when out(x) do R a system that must react
when receiving a stimulus of the form out(n) for n > 0. We notice that under
input out(42), P does not execute R since out(42) does not entail out(x) (i.e.
out(42) 6⊢ out(x)). The issue here is that x is a free-variable and hence does not
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act as a formal parameter (or place holder) for every term t such that out(t) is
entailed by the store.
In [27], tcc is extended for mobile reactive systems leading to universal
timed ccp (utcc). To model mobile behavior, utcc replaces the tcc ask oper-
ation when c do P with a more general parametric ask construction, namely
(abs ~x; c)P . This process can be viewed as a λ-abstraction of the process
P on the variables ~x under the constraint (or with the guard) c. Intuitively,
Q = (abs ~x; c)P performs P [~t/~x] in the current time interval for all the terms
~t s.t c[~t/~x] is entailed by the current store. For example, P = (abs x; out(x))R
under input out(42) executes R[42/x].
From a programming point of view, we can then see the variables ~x in the
abstraction (abs ~x; c)P as the formal parameters of P (see Remark 1).
Definition 2 (utcc Processes) The utcc processes result from replacing in
the syntax in Definition 1 the expression when c do P with (abs ~x; c)P with
the variables in ~x being pairwise distinct.
As explained above, the process Q = (abs ~x; c)P executes P [~t/~x] in the
current time interval for all the terms ~t s.t c[~t/~x] is entailed by the store. When
|~x| = 0 (i.e. ~x = ǫ), we recover the tcc ask operator and we write when c do P
instead of (abs ǫ; c)P .
The process Q = (abs ~x; c)P binds ~x in P and c. Therefore, we extend ac-
cordingly the sets bv(Q) and fv(Q) of bound and free variables. Furthermore Q
evolves into skip at the end of the time unit, i.e. abstractions are not persistent
when passing from one time-unit to the next one.
Definition 3 (utcc programs) Let D be a set of procedure declarations of the
form p(~y) :– P . A utcc program takes the form D.P where P is a process. For
every procedure name, we assume that there exists one and only one correspond-
ing declaration in D.
Remark 1 The utcc calculus was introduced in [27] without procedure defini-
tions. Here we add them to properly deal with tcc programs with recursion.
In utcc, recursive definitions do not add any expressiveness since they can be
encoded by using abstractions. The reader can find in [13][Appendix B] the
encoding.
We conclude this section with an example of mobile behavior in utcc. Here,
a process P sends a local variable to Q. Then, both processes can communicate
through the shared variable.
Example 2 Assume two components P and Q of a system such that P creates
a local variable that must share with Q. Roughly, this system can be modeled as
P = (localx) (tell(out(x)) ‖ P ′)
Q = (abs z; out(z))Q′
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In the next section, we shall see that the parallel composition of P and Q evolves
to a process of the form
(localx) (P ′ ‖ Q′[x/z])
where P ′ and Q′ share the local variable x created by P . Then, any information
produced by P ′ on x can be seen by Q′ and vice versa.
2.3 Operational Semantics (SOS)
The structural operational semantics (SOS) of tcc and utcc considers tran-
sitions between process-store configurations 〈P, c〉 with stores represented as
constraints and processes quotiented by ≡. We use γ, γ′, . . . to range over con-
figurations.
Definition 4 Let ≡ be the smallest congruence satisfying:
1. P ≡ Q if they differ only by a renaming of bound variables (alpha-conversion).
2. P ‖ skip ≡ P .
3. P ‖ Q ≡ Q ‖ P .
4. P ‖ (Q ‖ R) ≡ (P ‖ Q) ‖ R.
5. P ‖ (local ~x; c)Q ≡ (local ~x; c) (P ‖ Q) if ~x 6∈ fv(P ) (Scope Extrusion)
6. (local ~x; c) (local ~y; d)P ≡ (local ~x; ~y ; c∧d)P if ~x∩~y = ∅ and ~y /∈ fv(c).
Extend ≡ by decreeing that 〈P, c〉 ≡ 〈Q, c〉 iff P ≡ Q.
Transitions are given by the relations −→ and =⇒ in Table 1. The internal
transition 〈P, d〉 −→ 〈P ′, d′〉 should be read as “P with store d reduces, in one
internal step, to P ′ with store d′ ”. The observable transition P
(c,d)
====⇒ R should
be read as “P on input c, reduces in one time unit to R and outputs d”. The
observable transitions are obtained from finite sequences of internal ones.
We only describe some of the rules in Table 1. See [23, 27] for further details.
The rules are easily seen to realize the operational intuitions given above. As
clarified below, the seemingly missing rules for next and unless processes are
given by ROBS.
Let Q = (localx; c)P in Rule RLOC. The global store is d and the local
store is c. We distinguish between the external (corresponding to Q) and the
internal point of view (corresponding to P ). From the internal point of view,
the information about x, possibly appearing in the “global” store d, cannot be
observed. Thus, before reducing P we first hide the information about x that Q
may have in d by using the cylindrification operator ∃x in d. Similarly, from the
external point of view, the observable information about x that the reduction
of the internal agent P may produce (i.e., c′) cannot be observed. Thus we also
hide it by ∃xc
′ before adding it to the global store. Additionally, we make c′
the new private store of the evolution of the internal process.
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Internal Transitions :
RTELL
〈tell(c), d〉 −→ 〈skip, d ⊔ c〉
RPAR
〈P, c〉 −→
˙
P ′, d
¸
〈P ‖ Q, c〉 −→
˙
P ′ ‖ Q, d
¸
RUNL
d ⊢ c
〈unless c next P, d〉 −→ 〈skip, d〉
RLOC
〈P, c ⊔ (∃~xd)〉 −→
˙
P ′, c′ ⊔ (∃~xd)
¸
〈(local ~x; c)P, d〉 −→
˙
(local ~x; c′)P ′, d ⊔ ∃~xc′
¸
RABS
d ⊢ c[~t/~x] |~t| = |~x|
〈(abs ~x; c)P, d〉 −→
˙
P [~t/~x]||(abs ~x; c ⊔ ~x 6
.
= ~t )P, d
¸
RSTR
γ1 −→ γ2
γ′1 −→ γ
′
2
if γ1 ≡ γ
′
1 and γ2 ≡ γ
′
2
RCALL
p(~y) :– P ∈ D
〈p(~x), d〉 −→
D
∆~x~yP, d
E
RREP
〈!P, d〉 −→ 〈P ||next !P, d〉
Observable Transition :
ROBS
〈P, c〉 −→∗ 〈Q, d〉 6−→
P
(c,d)
====⇒ F (Q)
where F(P) =
8>><
>>:
skip if P = skip or P = (abs ~x; c)Q
F (P1) ‖ F (P2) if P = P1 ‖ P2
(local ~x)F (Q) if P = (local ~x; c)Q
Q if P = nextQ
Q if P = unless c nextQ
Table 1: Operational Semantics for tcc and utcc. ≡ is given in Definition 4.
In RABS, ~x 6
.
= ~t denotes
∨
1≤i≤|~x| xi 6
.
= ti. If |~x| = 0, ~x 6
.
= ~t is defined as false.
Let Q = (abs ~x; c)P in Rule RABS. If the current store entails c[~t/~x] then
P [~t/~x] is executed. Additionally, the abstraction persists in the current time
interval to allow other potential replacements of ~x in P . Notice that the guard c
is augmented with ~x 6
.
= ~t (syntactic difference) to avoid executing P [~t/~x] again.
We assume then the constraint “6
.
=” to be defined in the constraint system.
Furthermore, without loss of generality (by alpha conversion), we assume that
the variables in ~x does not occur in ~t.
The rule RCALL makes use of the diagonal elements (see Section 2) to model
parameter passing as standardly done in ccp [29]. In this equation,
∆~x~yP = (local~a) (! tell(d~x~a) ‖ (local ~y) (! tell(d~a~y) ‖ P ))
where the variables in ~a are assumed to occur neither in the declaration nor in
the process P , and d~x~y denotes the constraint
⊔
1≤i≤|~x| dxiyi . Roughly speaking,
∆~x~y equates the actual parameters ~x and the formal parameters ~y. What we
observe is then the execution of P [~x/~y].
Rule ROBS says that an observable transition from P labeled with (c, d)
is obtained from a terminating sequence of internal transitions from 〈P, c〉 to
〈Q, d〉. The process R to be executed in the next time interval is equivalent to
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F (Q) (the “future” of Q). F (Q) is obtained by removing from Q abstractions
and any local information which has been stored in Q, and by “unfolding” the
sub-terms within next and unless expressions.
Now we can show how the evolution of the processes in Example 2 leads to
a configuration where the variable x created by P is sent to Q and then, both
processes can communicate using it.
Example 3 Let P and Q be as in Example 2. The parallel composition R =
P ‖ Q under input true evolves as follows:
〈R, true〉−→∗〈(localx; c) (P ′ ‖ (abs z; out(z))Q′),∃x(c)〉
−→∗〈(localx; c) (P ′ ‖ Q′[x/z] ‖ Q′′),∃x(c)〉
where Q′′ = (abs z; out(z) ⊔ x 6
.
= z)Q′ and c = out(x). Notice that P ′ and
Q′[x/z] share the local variable x.
2.3.1 Observables and Input-output Behavior
In this section we formally define the behavior of a process P relating its outputs
under the influence of a sequence of inputs (constraints) from the environment.
Definition 5 (Behavior) Let s = c1.c2...ci and s
′ = c′1.c
′
2...c
′
i be sequences of
constraints. If P = P1
(c1,c
′
1)====⇒ P2
(c2,c
′
2)====⇒ ...Pi
(ci,c
′
i)====⇒, we write P
(s,s′)
====⇒.
The set
io(P ) = {(s, s′) | P
(s,s′)
====⇒}
denotes the input-output behavior of P .
In [27], the outputs of a utcc process were proven to be equivalent up to ≡:
Theorem 1 (Determinism [27]) Let P be a utcc process. If P
(s,s′)
====⇒ and
P
(s,s′′)
====⇒ then s′ ≡ s′′
Notice that, unlike the other constructs in utcc, the unless operator ex-
hibits non-monotonic input-output behavior in the following sense: Let P =
unless c nextQ. Given s ≤ s′, if (s, w), (s′, w′) ∈ io(P ), it may be the case
that w 6≤ w′. For example, take Q = tell(d), s = trueω and s′ = c. trueω.
Then, w = true .d. trueω and w′ = c. trueω with w 6≤ w′.
We then define a monotonic process as follows:
Definition 6 (Monotonic Processes) We say that P is a monotonic process
iff P does not have occurrences of processes of the form unless c nextQ.
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2.3.2 Strongest Postcondition
Given a process P , we can show that io(P ) is a partial closure operator [26],
i.e., it is a function satisfying extensiveness and idempotence. Furthermore, if P
is monotonic, io(P ) is a closure operator satisfying additionally monotonicity.
A pleasant property of closure operators is that they are uniquely determined
by their set of fixpoints, here called the strongest postcondition.
Definition 7 (Strongest Postcondition) Given a utcc process P , the strongest
postcondition of P , denoted by sp(P ), is defined as the set {s | (s, s) ∈ io(P )}.
Intuitively, s ∈ sp(P ), iff P under input s cannot add any information
whatsoever, i.e. s is a quiescent sequence for P . We also can think of sp(P )
as the set of sequences that P can output under the influence of an arbitrary
environment. Therefore, proving whether P satisfies a given property A, in the
presence of any environment, reduces to proving whether sp(P ) is a subset of
the the set of sequences (outputs) satisfying the property A.
Finally, it is worth noticing that for the monotonic fragment of utcc, the
input-output behavior can be retrieved from the strongest postcondition. This
is formalized in the following theorem whose proof is standard, given that io(·)
is a closure operator.
Theorem 2 Let min be the minimum function w.r.t. the order induced by
≤. Given a monotonic utcc process P , (s, s′) ∈ io(P ) iff s′ = min(sp(P ) ∩
{w | s ≤ w})
3 A Denotational model for TCC and UTCC
As we explained before, the strongest postcondition relation fully captures the
behavior of a process considering any possible output under an arbitrary en-
vironment. In this section we develop a denotational model for the strongest
postcondition. The semantics is compositional and it is the basis for the abstract
interpretation framework we develop in Section 4.
Our semantics is built on the closure operator semantics for ccp and tcc in
[29, 28]. Unlike the denotational semantics for utcc in [26], our semantics is
more appropriate for the data-flow analysis due to its simpler domain based on
sequences of constraints instead of sequences of temporal formulae. In Section
6 we elaborate more on the differences between both semantics.
Roughly speaking, the semantics is based on a (continuous) immediate con-
sequence operator TD, which computes in a bottom-up fashion the interpretation
of each procedure definition p(~x) :– P in D. Such an interpretation is given in
terms of the set of the quiescent sequences for p(~x).
3.1 Compositional Semantics
Let ProcHeads denote the set of process names with their formal parameters
and recall that Cω stands for the set of infinite sequences of constraints. We
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shall call Interpretations the set of functions in the domain ProcHeads → P(Cω).
The semantics is defined as a function [[·]] : (ProcHeads → P(Cω)) → (Proc →
P(Cω)) which given an interpretation I, associates to each process a set of
sequences of constraints.
Let us give some intuitions about the semantic equations in Table 2. Recall
that [[·]] aims at capturing the strongest postcondition (or quiescent sequences)
of a process P , i.e. the sequences s s.t. P under input s cannot add any
information whatsoever. So, skip cannot add any information to any sequence
(Equation DSKIP). The sequences to which tell(c) cannot add information are
those whose first element entails c (Equation DTELL). A sequence is quiescent
for P ‖ Q if it is for P and Q (Equation DPAR).
The process nextP has no influence on the first element of a sequence,
thus d.s is quiescent for it if s is quiescent for P (Equation DNEXT). A similar
explanation can be given for the process unless c nextP (Equation DUNL). A
sequence s is quiescent for !P if it is quiescent for every process of the form
next nP with n ≥ 0. Then, every suffix of s must be quiescent for P (Equation
DREP).
We say that s is an ~x-variant of s′ if ∃~xs(i) = ∃~xs
′(i) for i > 0 (i.e. s
and s′ differ only on the information about ~x). A sequence s is quiescent for
Q = (local ~x; c)P if there exists an ~x-variant s′ of s s.t. s′ is quiescent for P
and s′(1) ⊢ c. Hence, if P cannot add any information to s′ then Q cannot add
any information to s.
The abstraction process (abs x; c)P can be seen as the parallel composition∏
~t∈T |~x|
(when c do P )[~t/~x] where T denotes the set of terms in the underlying
constraint system. Therefore, the Equation DABS is given in terms of the equa-
tion for the ask operator [28]: a sequence d.s is quiescent for when c do P
either if d does not entail c or if d entails c and d.s is quiescent for P (Equation
DASK). This way, s is quiescent for (abs x; c)P , if for all term ~t, s(1) ⊢ c[~t/~x]
implies that s is quiescent for P [~t/~x] (rule DABS).
Finally, the meaning of a procedure call is directly given by the interpreta-
tion I.
The domain of the denotation is E = (E,⊆c) where E = P(Cω) and ⊆c is
a Smyth-like ordering defined as follows: Let X,Y ∈ E and . be the preorder
s.t X . Y iff for all y ∈ Y , there exists x ∈ X s.t. x ≤ y. X ⊆c Y iff X . Y
and (Y . X implies Y ⊆ X). The bottom of E is then Cω (the set of all the
sequences). We do not consider the empty set to be part of the domain. Then,
the top element is the singleton {falseω} (since false is the greatest element
in (C,≤)).
Let us briefly elaborate on the choice of the domain above. The upward
closure which is implicit in the Smyth powerdomain (in the sense that every set
is equivalent to its upward closure) is necessary in order to deal correctly with
the entailment of constraints (d ⊢ c iff c ≤ d) and with the parallel operator (in-
tersection). This would not be possible with the Hoare or with the Egli-Milner
powerdomains, which are not upward closed. Roughly speaking, if we consider
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for instance the Hoare powerdomain, then the fixpoint construction should start
with a bottom defined as the interpretation which assigns to every process defi-
nition the empty set or the singleton {trueω}. But in these interpretations the
parallel composition of tell(c) with a call p() would be empty, which does not
correspond to the standard meaning for these operators. A similar situation
arises when considering the Egli-Milner powerdomain.
Formally, the semantics is defined as follows:
Definition 8 (Concrete Semantics) Let [[·]]I be defined as in Table 2. The
semantics of a program D.P is defined as the least fixpoint of the continuous
operator:
TD(I)(p(~y)) = [[∆
~x
~yP
′]]I if p(~x) :– P
′ ∈ D
We shall use [[P ]] to represent [[P ]]lfp(TD)
Let us exemplify the least fixpoint construction above with a system similar
to that of Example 2.
Example 4 Assume two constraints outa(·) and outb(·) ,intuitively represent-
ing outputs of names on two different channels a and b. Let D be the following
procedure definitions
D = p() :– tell(outa(x)) ‖ next tell(outa(y))
q() :– (abs z; outa(z)) tell(outb(z)) ‖ next q()
r() :– p() ‖ q()
The procedure p() outputs on channel a the variables x and y in the first and
second time-units respectively. The procedure q() resends on channel b every
message received on channel a. Starting from the bottom interpretation I⊥ (as-
signing Cω to each name procedure), the semantics of r() is obtained as follows
I0 : p→ {c.c
′.s | c ⊢ outa(x) and c
′ ⊢ outa(y)}
q → {c1.s | c1 ⊢ outa(t) implies c1 ⊢ outb(t)}
r → Cω ∩ Cω = Cω
I1 : p→ I0(p)
q → {c1.c2.s | ci ⊢ outa(t) implies ci ⊢ outb(t) , i=1,2}
r → I0(p) ∩ I0(q)
. . .
Iω : p→ I0(p)
q → {s | (s(i) ⊢ outa(t) imp. s(i) ⊢ outb(t) for i > 0}
r → Iω(p) ∩ Iω(q)
where t denotes any term. In words, if s ∈ [[r()]] then s(1) ⊢ outa(x), s(2) ⊢
outa(y) and for i ≥ 1, if s(i) ⊢ outa(t) then s(i) ⊢ outb(t)
3.2 Semantic Correspondence
In this section we prove the semantic correspondence between the operational
and the denotational semantics. Before that, it is worth noticing that un-
like tcc, some utcc processes may exhibit infinite behavior during a time-
unit due to the abstraction operator. Take for example a process of the form
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P = (abs x; c(x)) tell(c(x + 1)). Under input c(1), this process will generate
constraints of the form c(2), c(3), ..., thus never producing an observable transi-
tion (see [27] for details). This behavior will arise in the application to security
in Section 5.3, where the model of the attacker may generate infinitely many
messages. We shall show later that the abstract semantics allows us to restrict
the number of messages generated, thus avoiding this situation.
Considering this fact, it may be the case that sequences in the input-output
behavior (and then in the strongest postcondition) are finite or even the empty
sequence ǫ. Nevertheless, this is not the case for all utcc process. We shall call
well-terminated the processes which do not exhibit infinite internal behavior:
Definition 9 (Well-termination) The process P is said to be well-terminated
if and only if for every s such that s(i) 6= false for each i, there exists s′ such
as (s, s′) ∈ io(P ).
The fragment of well-terminated processes is a meaningful one. For instance,
it was shown to be enough to encode Turing-powerful formalisms in [26]. It
has also found application, e.g., in multimedia interaction systems [24] and
declarative interpretation of languages for structured communications [19].
The following theorem shows that if a (finite) sequence s is in the strongest
postcondition, then there exists an infinite sequence s′ in the denotation such
that s is a prefix of s′.
Theorem 3 (Soundness) Let [[·]] be as in Definition 8. Given a program D.P ,
if s ∈ sp(P ) then there exists s′ s.t. s.s′ ∈ [[P ]].
For the converse of the previous theorem, we have similar technical problems
as in the case of tcc, namely: the combination between the local and the unless
operator—see [8, 23] for details. Thus, similarly to [8, 23], completeness is
verified only for the following fragment of utcc:
Definition 10 (Loc. Ind. & abs-unless fragment) We say that a process
P is a locally independent (resp. abstracted-unless free) iff P has no occurrences
of unless processes under the scope of a local (resp. abs) operator. These
definitions are extended to programs D.P by decreeing that P and all Pi in
pi(~x) :– Pi ∈ D satisfy the conditions above.
Theorem 4 (Completeness) Let D.P be a locally independent and abstracted-
unless free program s.t. s ∈ [[P ]]. For all prefixes s′ of s, if there exists s′′ s.t.
(s′, s′′) ∈ io(P ) then s′ ≡ s′′, i.e., s′ ∈ sp(P ).
4 Abstract Interpretation Framework
In this section we develop an abstract interpretation framework [6] for the anal-
ysis of utcc programs. The framework is based on the above denotational
semantics, thus allowing for a compositional analysis of utcc (and then tcc)
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DSKIP [[skip]]I = C
ω
DTELL [[tell(c)]]I = {d.s ∈ C
ω | d ⊢ c}
DPAR [[P ‖ Q]]I = [[P ]]I ∩ [[Q]]I
DNEXT [[nextP ]]I = {d.s ∈ C
ω | s ∈ [[P ]]I}
DUNL [[unless c nextP ]]I = {d.s ∈ C
ω | d 6⊢ c and s ∈ [[P ]]I} ∪ {d.s ∈ C
ω | d ⊢ c}
DREP [[!P ]]I = {s ∈ C
ω | for all s′′, s′ s.t. s = s′′.s′, s′ ∈ [[P ]]I}
DLOC [[(local ~x; c)P ]]I = {s ∈ C
ω | there exists an ~x-variant s′ of s s.t.
s′(1) ⊢ c and s′ ∈ [[P ]]I}
DASK [[when c do P ]]I = {d.s ∈ C
ω | d ⊢ c and d.s ∈ [[P ]]I} ∪ {d.s ∈ C
ω | d 6⊢ c}
DABS [[(abs ~x; c)P ]]I =
⋂
~t∈T |~x|
[[(when c do P )[~t/~x]]]I
DCALL [[p(~x)]]I = I(p(~x))
Table 2: Semantic Equations for tcc and utcc constructs. In DABS, if |~x| = 0
then T |~x| is defined as {ǫ}
programs. The abstraction proceeds in two-levels: (1) we abstract the constraint
system and then (2) we abstract the infinite sequences of abstract constraints by
a finite cut. The abstraction in (1) allows us to reuse the most popular abstract
domains previously defined for logic programming. Adapting those domains, it
is possible to perform, e.g., groundness, freeness, type and suspension analy-
ses of tcc and utcc programs. Furthermore, it allows us to restrict the set of
terms to be considered in the Equation DABS. Thus, we can even approximate
the output of a non-well terminated process as we show in Section 5.3. On
the other hand, the abstraction in (2) along with (1) allows for computing the
approximated output of the program in a finite number of steps.
4.1 Abstract Constraint Systems
Let us recall some notions from [12] and [32].
Definition 11 Given two constraint systems
C = 〈C,≤ ⊔, true, false,Var ,∃, d〉
A = 〈A,≤α ⊔α, trueα, falseα,Var ,∃α, dα〉
a description (C, α,A) consists of an abstract domain (A,≤α) and a monotonic
abstraction function α : C → A. We lift α to sequences of constraints in the
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obvious way.
We shall use cκ, dκ to range over constraints in A and sκ, s
′
κ to range over
sequences in Aω and A∗. Let ⊢α be defined as in the concrete counterpart, i.e.
cκ ≤
α dκ iff dκ ⊢
α cκ. The set of abstract terms is denoted by Tκ and ranged
by tκ, t
′
κ...
Following standard lines in [12, 32] we impose the following restrictions over
α:
Definition 12 (Correctness) Let α : C → A be monotonic. We say that A
is upper correct w.r.t the constraint system C if for all c ∈ C and x, y ∈ V:
(1) α(∃xc) = ∃
α
xα(c). (2) α(dxy) = d
α
xy. (3) α(c ⊔ d) ⊢
α α(c) ⊔α α(d). Let
αt : T → Tκ be the term-abstraction structurally based on α. Given the sequence
of variables ~x and ~t,~t′ ∈ T |~x|, (4) α(c[~t/~x]) = α(c[~t′/~x]) whenever αt(~t) = αt(~t′).
Conditions (1), (2) and (3) relate the cylindrification, diagonal and lub op-
erators of both constraints systems. Condition (4) is only necessary to have a
safe approximation of the abs operator in utcc, but it is not required when
analyzing tcc programs. It informally says that substituting by terms mapped
to the same abstract term, must lead to the same abstract constraint.
In the example below we illustrate an abstract domain for the groundness
analysis of tcc programs. Here we give just an intuitive description of it. We
shall elaborate more on this domain and its applications in Section 5.1.
Example 5 Let the Herbrand constraint system (Hcs) [29] be the concrete do-
main. In Hcs, a first-order language L with equality is assumed. The entailment
relation is that one expects from equality, e.g., [x|y] = [a|z] must entail x = a
and y = z. Terms, as usual, are variables, constants and functions applied on
terms. As abstract constraint system, let constraints be predicates of the form
iff (x, []) meaning that x is a ground variable. Abstract terms are variables and
the special term g meaning “ground”. In this setting, α(x = [a]) = iff (x, [])
(i.e., x is a ground variable). Furthermore αt(a) = αt(b) = g. By Condition
(4) in Definition 12, α((x = [y])[a/y]) = α((x = [y])[b/y]) = iff (x, []).
We conclude this section by defining when an “abstract” constraint approx-
imates a concrete one.
Definition 13 (Approximations) LetA be upper correct w.r.t C and (C, α,A)
be a description. Given dκ = α(d), we say that dκ is the best approximation of
d. Furthermore, for all cκ ≤
α dκ we say that cκ approximates d and we write
cκ ∝ d. This definition is extended to sequences of constraints in the obvious
way.
4.2 Abstract Semantics
Starting from the semantics in Section 3, we develop here an abstract semantics
which approximates the observable behavior of a program and is adequate for
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modular data-flow analysis. We focus our attention on a special class of abstract
interpretations obtained from what we call a sequence abstraction mapping pos-
sibly infinite sequences of (abstract) constraints into finite ones.
Definition 14 (Sequence Abstraction) A sequence abstraction τ : Aω ∪
A∗ → A∗ is a reductive (τ(sκ) ≤
α sκ) and monotonic operator. We lift τ
to sets of sequences in the obvious way: τ(Sκ) = {sκ | sκ = τ(s
′
κ) and s
′
κ ∈ S}.
A simple albeit useful instance of the abstraction τ is the sequence(k) cut.
This abstraction approximates a sequence by projecting it to its first k elements,
e.g., sequence(2)(c1.c2.c3....) = c1.c2.
Given a description (C, α,A), we choose as concrete domain E = (E,⊆c) as
defined in Section 3. The abstract domain is A = (A,⊆α) where A = P(A∗)
and ⊆α is defined similarly to ⊆c: Let X,Y ∈ A and .α be the preorder s.t.
X .α Y iff for all y ∈ Y , there exists x ∈ X s.t. x ≤α y. X ⊆α Y iff X .α Y
and (Y .α X implies Y ⊆ X). The bottom and top of this domain are, similar
to the concrete domain, A∗ and {falseα . falseα ...} respectively.
We require A to be noetherian (i.e., there are no infinite ascending chains).
This guarantees that the fixpoint of the abstract semantics can be reached in a
finite number of iterations.
The semantic equations are given in Table 3. We shall dwell a little upon
the description of the rules AASK, AABS and AUNL. The other cases are easier.
We notice that from the fact α(d) ⊢α α(c) we cannot conclude d ⊢ c. For
example, let d = (x = 1), c = (x = 2) and iff (·) be as in Example 5. We have
iff (x, []) ⊢α iff (x, []) but x = 1 6⊢ x = 2. Then, the equation AASK cannot be
obtained from the equation DASK by simply replacing the condition d ⊢ c with
dκ ⊢
α α(c). We thus follow [32, 11, 12] for the abstract semantics of the ask
operator. Intuitively, the Equation AASK says that if the abstract computation
proceeds, then every concrete computation it approximates proceeds too. This
is formalized by the relation dκ ⊢A c, meaning that the abstract constraint dκ
entails c if all concrete constraint approximated by dκ entails c.
Definition 15 Given dκ ∈ A and c ∈ C, dκ ⊢A c iff for all c
′ ∈ C s.t. dκ ∝ c
′,
c′ ⊢ c.
In Equation AABS, we compute the intersection over the abstract terms (Tκ)
and we replace ~x with a concrete term ~t′ s.t. αt(~t′) = ~tκ. Notice that it may
be the case that there exists ~t1, ~t2 s.t. αt(~t1) = αt(~t2) = ~tκ. Using property (4)
in Definition 12, we can show that the choice of the concrete term is irrelevant
(see [13][Appendix A]).
One could think of defining the abstract semantics of the unless operator
similarly to that of the when operator as follows:
[[unless c nextP ]]τX = τ({dκ.sκ | dκ 6⊢A c and sκ ∈ [[P ]]
τ
X)
∪ τ({dκ.sκ | dκ ⊢A c)
Nevertheless, this equation leads to a non safe approximation of the concrete
semantics. This is because from dκ 6⊢A c we cannot conclude that d 6⊢ c where
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α(d) = dκ. To see this, take Q = unless c nextP and d s.t. d ⊢ c. Then
d. trueω ∈ [[Q]]. Take c′ s.t. c′ 6⊢ c and c′κ = α(c
′) ≤α α(d) = dκ. Then, dκ ∝ c
′
and dκ 6⊢A c. If P 6= skip, we have dκ. true
∗ /∈ [[Q]]τ .
Defining dκ 6⊢A c as true iff c
′ 6⊢ c for all c′ approximated by dκ does not solve
the problem. This is because under this definition, dκ 6⊢A c would not hold for
any dκ and c: false entails all the concrete constraints and it is approximated
for every abstract constraint.
Therefore, we cannot give a better (safe) approximation of the semantics of
Q = unless c nextP than τ(Aω), i.e. [[Q]]τX = [[skip]]
τ
X (Rule AUNL).
We define formally the abstract semantics as follows:
Definition 16 Let [[·]]τX be as in Table 3. The abstract semantics of a program
D.P is defined as the least fixpoint of the following continuous semantic operator:
TαD(X)(p(~x)) = [[(∆
~y
~xP
′)]]τX if p(~y) :– P
′ ∈ D
We shall use [[P ]]τ to denote [[P ]]τ
lfp(TαD)
4.3 Soundness of the Approximation
This section proves the correctness of the abstract semantics in Definition 16.
We first establish a Galois insertion between the concrete and the abstract
domains. From [32, Proposition 3], we deduce the following:
α(E) := τ({α(s) | s ∈ E})
γ(A) := {s | τ(α(s)) ∈ A}
We have used α to avoid confusion with α in (C, α,A). We can lift in the
standard way to abstract interpretations [6] the approximation induced by the
above abstraction. Let I : ProcHeads → E, X : ProcHeads → A and p a
procedure name. Then
α(I)(p) := τ({α(s) | s ∈ I(p)})
γ(X)(p) := {s | τ(α(s)) ∈ X(p)}
The following theorem states that concrete computations are safely approx-
imated by the abstract semantics.
Theorem 5 (Soundness of the approximation) LetA be upper correct w.r.t.
C, (C, α,A) be a description and τ be a sequence abstraction. Let [[·]] and [[·]]τ be
respectively as in Definitions 8 and 16. Given a utcc program D.P , if s ∈ [[P ]]
then τ(α(s)) ∈ [[P ]]τ .
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ASKIP [[skip]]
τ
X = τ(A
ω)
ATELL [[tell(c)]]
τ
X = τ({dκ.sκ ∈ A
ω | dκ ⊢
α α(c)})
APAR [[P ‖ Q]]
τ
X = [[P ]]
τ
X ∩ [[Q]]
τ
X
ANEXT [[nextP ]]
τ
X = τ({dκ.sκ ∈ A
∗ | sκ ∈ [[P ]]
τ
X})
AUNL [[unless c nextP ]]
τ
X = τ(A
ω)
AREP [[!P ]]
τ
X = τ({sκ ∈ A
∗ | for all s′κ, wκ s.t.
sκ = wκ.s
′
κ, s
′
κ ∈ [[P ]]
τ
X})
ALOC [[(local ~x; c)P ]]
τ
X = τ({sκ ∈ A
∗ | there exists a ~x-variant s′κ of sκ s.t.
s′κ(1) ⊢
α α(c) and s′κ ∈ [[P ]]
τ
X})
AASK [[when c do P ]]
τ
X = τ({dκ.sκ ∈ A
∗| dκ 6⊢A c})∪
{dκ.sκ ∈ A
∗| dκ ⊢A c and dκ.sκ ∈ [[P ]]
τ
X}
AABS [[(abs ~x; c)P ]]
τ
X =
⋂
~tκ∈T
|~x|
κ
[[(when c do P )[~t′/~x]]]τX
where αt(~t′) = ~tκ
ACALL [[p(~x)]]
τ
X = X(p(~x))
Table 3: Abstract denotational semantics for utcc. ⊢A in Definition 15
5 Applications
This section describes two specific abstract domains as instances of our frame-
work. Firstly, we tailor two abstract domains from logic programming to per-
form a groundness and a type analysis of a tcc program. We then apply this
analysis in the verification of a reactive system in tcc. Secondly, we abstract a
constraint system dealing with cryptographic primitives. Here we use the ab-
stract semantics to exhibit a secrecy flaw in a security protocol programmed in
utcc.
5.1 Groundness Analysis
In logic programming, one useful analysis is groundness. It aims at determining
if a variable will always be bound to a ground term. This information can
be used, e.g., for optimization in the compiler (to remove code for suspension
checks at runtime) or as base for other data flow analyses such as independence
analysis, suspension analysis, etc. Here we present a groundness analysis for
a tcc program. To this end, we shall use as concrete domain the Herbrand
constraint system (Hcs) [29] (see Example 5).
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Assume the following procedure definitions:
gena(x) = (local x
′) (! tell(x = [a|x′]) ‖
when goa do next gena(x
′) ‖
when stopa do ! tell(x
′ = [ ]))
genb(x) = (local x
′) (! tell(x = [b|x′]) ‖
when gob do next genb(x
′) ‖
when stopb do ! tell(x
′ = [ ]))
append(x, y, z) = when x = [ ] do ! tell(y = z) ‖
when ∃x′,x′′ (x = [x
′ |x′′]) do
(local x′, x′′, z′) (! tell(x = [x′ | x′′]) ‖
! tell(z = [x′ | z′]) ‖
next append(x′′, y, z′))
The process gena(x) adds to the stream x an “a” when the environment
provides goa as input. Under input stopa, it terminates the stream binding its
tail to the empty list. Let x goa and x stopa be two distinct variables different
from x and x′, and goa and stopa be the constraints x goa = [] and x stopa = [].
The process genb can be explained similarly. The process append(x, y, z) binds
z to the concatenation of x and y.
We shall use Pos [1] as abstract domain for the groundness analysis. In
Pos, positive propositional formulae represent groundness dependencies among
variables. Elements in the domain are ordered by logical implication. Let αg
be defined over equations in normal form as: αg(x = t) = iff (x, fv(t)).
For instance, αg(x = [y|z]) = iff (x, {y, z}) representing the propositional
formula x⇔ (y ∧ z) meaning, x is ground if and only if y and z are grounds.
Notice that Pos does not distinguish between the empty list and a list of
ground terms, i.e., dκ = αg(x = []) = αg(x = [a]) = iff (x, {}). Therefore, we
have dκ 6⊢A x = [] (see Definition 15). This means, e.g., that the semantics of
P = tell(x = []) ‖ when x = [] do tell(y = []) is (safely) approximated by
iff (x, []). Thus we lose the information added by tell(y = []).
We can improve the accuracy of our analysis by using the abstract domain
in [4] to derive information about type dependencies on terms. The abstraction
is defined as follows:
αT (x = t) =
{
list(x, xs) if t = [y | xs] for some y
nil(x) if t = []
Informally, list(x, xs) means x is a list iff xs is a list and nil(x) means x
is the empty list. If x is a list we write list(x). Elements in the domain are
ordered by logical implication.
Let Ag = 〈A,≤
α ⊔α, trueα, falseα,Var ,∃α, dα〉 be the abstract constraint
system obtained from the reduced product ([6]) of the previous abstract do-
mains. Elements g, g′... ∈ A are tuples 〈cκ, dκ〉 where cκ corresponds to ground-
ness information and dκ to type dependency information. The abstraction func-
tion is defined as expected, i.e., α(c) = g = 〈αg(c), αT (c)〉 . The operations ⊔
α,
∃α correspond to logical conjunction and existential quantification over the com-
ponents of the tuple. The diagonal element dxy corresponds to 〈x = y, x = y〉.
Finally, 〈cκ, dκ〉 ≤
α 〈c′κ, d
′
κ〉 if c
′
κ ⇒ cκ and d
′
κ ⇒ dκ.
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Let τ = sequence(κ) and g1.g2....gκ ∈ [[Gena(x)]]
τ . By a derivation similar
to that of Example 4, if there exists i ∈ {1, .., κ} such that gi ⊢A stopa, one can
show that there exists ~x′ = x′0, x
′
1, ..., x
′
i such that
gi ⊢
α ∃~x′
〈
iff (x, x′0) ⊔
F
0≤j<i
iff (x′j , {x
′
j+1}) ⊔ iff (x
′
i, {}) ,
list(x, x′0) ⊔
F
0≤j<i
list(x′j , x
′
j+1) ⊔ nil(x
′
i)
〉
Thus, if gi ⊢A stopa we can deduce that x is a list and x is a ground variable,
i.e., gi ⊢
α 〈iff (x, []), list(x)〉.
Let sk = [[Gena(x) ‖ Genb(y) ‖ append(x, y, z)]]
τ . If there exist i, j ≤ κ
s.t. sκ(i) ⊢A stopa and sκ(j) ⊢A stopb, we can show that for l ≥ max(i, j), the
variables x, y and z are list of ground elements. More precisely,
sκ(l) ⊢
α 〈iff (x, []) ⊔ iff (y, []) ⊔ iff (z, []), list(x) ⊔ list(y) ⊔ list(z)〉
5.2 Analysis of Reactive Systems
Synchronous data flow languages [2] such as Esterel and Lustre can be encoded
as tcc processes [31, 28]. This makes tcc an expressive declarative framework
for the modeling and verification of reactive systems. Here we show how our
framework can provide additional reasoning techniques in tcc for the verification
of such systems. More precisely, we shall use the groundness analysis above to
verify if the simplified version of a control system for a microwave in Example 1
complies with its intended behavior: the door must be closed when it is turned
on.
We assume on, off, closed and open be respectively the constraints on =
[], off = [], close = [] and open = [] for variables on, off , close and open different
from E and E′. The symbols yes and stop denote constant symbols.
Our analysis consists in determining when the variable Error is bound to
a ground term. If the system is correct, it must happen when the the door is
open and the microwave is turned on.
Let τ = sequence(κ) for a given κ. We can show that if
sκ ∈ [[micCtrl(Error,Button)]]
τ
and sκ(i) ⊢A (open ⊔ on), then sκ(i) ⊢
α 〈iff (Error, []), list(Error)〉, i.e., Error
is a ground variable.
We then conclude that the system effectively binds the list Error to a ground
term whenever the system reaches an inconsistent state.
5.3 Analyzing Secrecy Properties
In [27] it was shown that the ability of utcc to model mobile behavior, as in
Example 2, allows for the modeling of security protocols. Nevertheless, the
model of the attacker is a non-well terminated process thus producing infinitely
many internal reductions. In this section we show how a suitable abstraction of
the cryptographic constraint system in [27] may allow us to bound the number
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of messages to be considered in a secrecy analysis. Then we exhibit a well-known
flaw in a security protocol.
We consider a constraint system whose terms are the possible messages gen-
erated during the execution of the protocol. Cryptographic primitives are rep-
resented as functions over such terms.
Definition 17 Let Σ be a signature with constant symbols in P ∪ K, function
symbols enc, pair , priv and pub and predicates out(·) and secret(·). Con-
straints in C are first-order formulae built over Σ.
Intuitively, P and K represent respectively the principal identifiers, e.g.
A,B, . . . and keys k, k′. We use {m}k and {m1,m2} respectively, for enc(m, k)
(encryption) and pair(m1,m2) (composition). For the generation of keys, priv(k)
stands for the private key associated to the value k and pub(k) for its public
key.
As standardly done in the verification of security protocols, a Dolev-Yao
attacker [10] is presupposed, able to eavesdrop, disassemble, compose, encrypt
and decrypt messages with available keys. The attacker can be modeled as
follows:
Disam :– (abs x, y; out({x, y})) tell(out (x) ⊔ out (y))
Comp :– (abs x, y; out(x) ⊔ out(y)) tell(out ({x, y}))
Enc :– (abs x, y; out(x) ⊔ out(y)) tell(out ({x}y))
Dec :– (abs x, k; out(priv(k)) ⊔ out({x}pub(k))) tell(out (x))
Pers :– (abs x; out(x))next tell(out(x))
Spy :– Disam ‖ Comp ‖ Enc ‖ Dec ‖ Pers ‖ nextSpy
The first four processes represent the abilities previously mentioned. Since
the final store is not automatically transferred to the next time-unit, the process
Pers represents the ability to remember all messages posted so far. Notice
that the processes Comp and Enc generate an infinite number of messages.
E.g., if the current store is out(m), the process Comp will add the constraints
out({m,m}), out({m, {m,m}}) and so on.
To deal with this state explosion problem, the number of messages to be
considered can be bound (see e.g. [30]). We formalize this with the following
abstraction.
Definition 18 (Abstract secure cons. system) LetM be the set of (terms)
messages in the constraint system in Definition 17 and lg : M→ N be defined
as:
lg(m) =
{
0 if m ∈ P ∪ K ∪Var
1 + lg(m1) + lg(k) if m = {m1}k
1 + lg(m1) + lg(m2) if m = {m1,m2}
Let cutκ be the following term abstraction
cutκ(m) =
{
m if lg(m) ≤ κ
m⊤ otherwise
with m⊤ /∈ M (representing all the messages with length greater than κ) . Let
C be as in Definition 17 and (C, α,A) be a description where α(out(m)) =
out(cutκ(m)) and α(secret(m)) = secret(cutκ(m)).
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5.3.1 Secrecy Analysis
Assume the following simplification of the Denning-Sacco key distribution pro-
tocol [9]:
msg1 A→ B : {A,m}pub(B)
msg2 B → A : {n}m
In the first message, A sends to B {A,m}pub(B) representing the composition
of the A’s identifier and the nonce (unguessable secret) m encrypted with the
B’s public key. With its private key, B is able to decrypt the message sent by
A and then creates the nonce n. B sends n encrypted with m. The goal of the
protocol is to keep secret n.
This protocol can be modeled in utcc as
init(i, r) :– (localm) tell(out({i,m}pub(r)))
‖ next init(i, r)
resp(t) :– (abs p, y; out({p, y}pub(t)))
(localn) ! tell(secret(n)) ‖
next tell(out({n}y))
‖ next resp(t)
Nonce generation is modeled by local constructs and the process tell(out(m))
models the broadcast of the messagem. Inputs (message reception) are modelled
by abs processes. Both, init and resp are recursively called since principals
may initiate different sessions during the execution of the protocol. Finally,
tell(secret(n)) in resp states that the nonce n cannot be revealed.
Assume an execution of the Denning-Sacco protocol with three principals
A,B,C where A starts the protocol with B and the private key of B is known
by the attacker:
DS = Spy ‖ init(A,B) ‖
Q
x∈{A,B,C}
(resp(x)) ‖ tell(out(priv(B)))
The abstraction cut3 and τ = sequence(2) allows us to verify the following:
if sκ ∈ [[DS]]
τ then sκ(2) ⊢
α ∃n(secret(n) ⊔ out(n))
meaning that DS leads to a secrecy attack. In fact, this is a well known
attack (see e.g. [3]) where the attacker replies to C the message sent by A to B
and C believes that he is establishing a session key with A. Since the attacker
knows m from the first message, she can decrypt {n}pub (m) and n is not longer
a secret between A and C as intended.
Notice the importance of having here a finite cut of the messages (terms)
generated for the process Spy to compute [[DS]]τ . This allows us to restrict the
set of terms considered by the abs operator and over-approximate the behavior
of the protocol.
5.3.2 A prototypical implementation
We have implemented our framework and the abstract domain for secrecy analy-
sis in a prototype developed in Oz (http://www.mozart-oz.org/). This tool is
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described in http://www.lix.polytechnique.fr/~colarte/prototype/ and
allows the user to compute the least element of the abstract semantics of a pro-
cess P . The current implementation supports constraints as those used in the
cryptographic constraint system (e.g., predicates of the form out(enc(x, pub(y)))).
It implements the sequence(κ) and cutκ′ abstractions where κ and κ
′ are pa-
rameters specified by the user. We started by implementing the secrecy analysis
since one of the most appealing application of the utcc calculus is the modeling
and verification of security protocols. Our goal in the short term is to develop
(or adapt from existing implementation) previously defined domains for logic
programs such as those used in Section 5.1. This then will provide a valuable
tool for the analysis of tcc and utcc programs.
The reader may find in the URL above a deeper description of the tool and
some examples. Furthermore, we provide the program excerpts to compute the
output of the secrecy analysis for the Denning-Sacco key distribution protocol
[9]. We also illustrate a similar analysis for the Needham-Schroeder Protocol
[20].
6 Concluding Remarks
Several frameworks and abstract domains for the analysis of logic programs have
been defined (see e.g. [6, 5, 1]). Those works differ from ours since they do not
deal with the temporal behavior and synchronization mechanisms present in
tcc-based languages. On the contrary, since our framework is parametric w.r.t
the abstract domain, it can benefit from those works.
We defined in [14] a framework for the declarative debugging of ntcc [23]
programs (a non-deterministic extension of tcc). The framework presented
here is more general since it was designed for the static analysis of tcc and
utcc programs and not only for debugging. Furthermore, as mentioned above,
it is parametric w.r.t an abstract domain. The language utcc is also more
involved: processes may exhibit infinite internal behavior and, unlike ntcc, utcc
can encode Turing powerful formalisms [26]. In [14] we also dealt with infinite
sequences of constraints and a similar finite cut over sequences was proposed
there.
In [27] a symbolic semantics for utcc was proposed to deal with the infinite
internal reductions of non well-terminated processes. This semantics, by means
of temporal formulae, represents finitely the infinitely many constraints (and
substitutions) the SOS may produce. The work in [26] introduces a denota-
tional semantics for utcc based on (partial) closure operators over sequences of
temporal logic formulae. This semantics captures compositionally the symbolic
strongest postcondition and it was shown to be fully abstract w.r.t the sym-
bolic semantics for the fragment of locally-independent and abstracted-unless
free processes (see Definition 10). The semantics here presented turns out to
be more appropriate than that in [26] to develop the abstract interpretation
framework in Section 4. Firstly, the inclusion relation between the strongest
postcondition and the semantics is verified for the whole language (Theorem 3)
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– in [26] this inclusion is verified only for the abstracted-unless free fragment–.
Secondly, this semantics makes use of the entailment relation over constraints
rather than the more involved entailment over first-order linear-time temporal
formulae as in [26]. This shall ease the implementation of tools based on the
framework. Finally, our semantics allows us to capture the behavior of tcc
programs with recursion. This is not possible with the semantics in [26] which
was thought only for utcc programs where recursion can be encoded.
For the kind of applications that stimulated the development of utcc, it was
defined entirely deterministic. The semantics here presented could smoothly be
extended to deal with some forms of non-determinism like those in [12], thus
widening the spectrum of applications of our framework. It would be also inter-
esting to study how our framework could adapt to stochastic and probabilistic
extensions of ccp-based languages which have found application e.g., in the
modeling of biological systems [25].
In [27] the symbolic semantics and the underlying temporal logic associated
to utcc are used to verify a security protocol. The flaw in the protocol was
exhibited by hand computing the symbolic outputs of the process. Here we
go further by exhibiting the flaw automatically with the help of a prototype.
Since our approach is based on approximations of the concrete semantics, not
detecting a flaw does not imply the correctness of it.
As we showed in Section 5.1, given that tcc is a sub-calculus of utcc, our
results apply straightforwardly to tcc programs. This work then provides the
theoretical basis for building tools for the data-flow analyses of utcc and tcc
programs whose verification and debugging are not trivial due to their concur-
rent nature and synchronization mechanisms. We have shown for example, how
to analyze groundness and how to detect mistakes in safety critical applications,
such as control systems and embedded systems.
Our results should foster the development of analyzers for different systems
modeled in utcc and its sub-calculi such as security protocols, reactive and
timed systems, biological systems, etc (see [25] for a survey of applications of
ccp-based languages). We plan also to perform freeness, suspension, type and
independence analyses among others. It is well known that this kind of analyses
have many applications, e.g. for code optimization in compilers, for improving
run-time execution, and for approximated verification.
We believe that the framework proposed here can also help to develop new
analyses for other languages for reactive systems (e.g. Esterel [2]), which can
be translated into tcc [31, 28] and for languages featuring mobile behavior as
the π-calculus [22]. For the latter, many analyses have been already defined,
see e.g. [15, 16]. As future work, it would be interesting to see if it is possible
to carry out similar analyses in our framework for suitable fragments of π that
can be encoded into utcc (see e.g., [19] that encodes a π-based language for
structured communication into utcc).
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